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1. INTRODUCTION
Rights management systems and laws designed to protect these
systems from circumvention occupy an increasingly central role in
increasingly heated discussions about online copyright enforcement.
Proponents argue that without these systems and laws, there is no
possibility of meaningful copyright enforcement online. Opponents
contend that the emerging technical and legal regimes for digital rights
management threaten copyright's traditional balance of rights and
limitations and are inconsistent with the preservation and growth of a
vibrant public domain. Without disclaiming the views we have
previously stated on those matters, I we would like to ask some rather
different questions. Thus far, the debate about rights management
systems has taken them as given - that is, it has taken decisions about
their design as variables exogenous to the policy process. We would
like to question this assumption. Can rights management systems be
designed and implemented in a way that preserves the traditional
copyright balance? If so, how might the law encourage this? Should
the law do so?
.
hi this paper, we consider whether rights management systems can
be supported l?y legal and institutional infrastructures that enable
appropriate public access to the works secured by these technologies.
We focus primarily on the design challenges posed by the fair use
doctrine, which historically has played a central role in preserving such
access. Throughout the paper, however, we also use the term "fair
use" to refer more generally to the variety of limiting doctrines ,vithin
copyright law that serve this goal. We begin in Part IT by reviewing the
contours of the fair use doctrine and the legal and policy requirements
that mandate appropriate public access to copyrighted works and other
publicly available informational works. Part ill discusses the nature and

1. Dan L Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L REv. 121, 168-76
(1999) [hereinafter Muddy Rules]; Dan L Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse (manuscript
on file with author) [hereinafter Anticircumvention Misuse]; Julie E. Cohen, Copyright
and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1799 (2000) [hereinafter Perfect Curve]; Julie
E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence ofSelf-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. W. 1089
(1998) [hereinafter Self-Help]; Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New
Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management", 97 MICH. L REv. 462 (1998)
[hereinafter Lochner in Cyberspace]; Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright
Management Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. W.
161 (1997) [hereinafter Reflections]; Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously:
A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L REv. 981
(1996) [hereinafter Cohen, Read Anonymously].
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purpose of rights management systems, their legal status under the
current anti-circumvention provisions of u.s. law, and their likely
effects on fair use. In Part N, we consider the foreseeable technical
and institutional options that might enable proper public access to
secured works and offer a proposal combining minimum system
flexibility requirements in exchange for copyright enforcement and "key
escrow" in exchange for anti-circumvention protection. Part V
assesses the legal feasibility of such a system and concludes that the
proposal comports with the United States' obligations under
international copyright agreements. Finally, Part VI considers whether
implementation of the proposal would represent good policy and
concludes that it may be the best realistic alternative for preserving fair
use in the digital age.

II. THE SOCIAL FuNCTIONS OF FAIR USE
Fair use perfonns a variety of rel~ted functions within the policy
framework of copyright law. First, the Supreme Court has identified
fair use as a type of "safety valve" that mediates between the strictures
of copyright and the demands of the First Amendment.2 Copyright is
a type of restraint on speech: The author's property right in an
expressive work legally restrains others in their use of that expression.
Such governmental restraints 011 speech are typically disfavored, yet in
the case of copyrightable content, the Constitution both allows
copyright restrictions and disallows governmental interference ,vith free
expression. Fair use partially reconciles these apparently contradictory
constitutional provisions by allowing the use of otherwise protected
material in criticism, comment, parody, news reporting, and similar
uses in the public interest.3 This arrangement preserves proprietary
rights in creative works while accommodating the public interest in
open dialogue, deliberation, and the advance of knowledge.4 Other
doctrines within copyright, most notably the so-called "idea-expression
distinction," also perfonn this function. s

2. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560
(1985).
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
4. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560.
5. See id. at 556; 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (1994). Courts and co=entators disagree
about whether the fair use doctrine and the idea-expression distinction are sufficient to
reconcile copyright law with the demands of the First Amendment, or whether other
constraints on copyright are necessruy. See, e.g., Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375
(D.C. Cir. 2001); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
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Fair use also has been identified as a device for correcting two
types of market failure that are likely to occur in the market for
propertized information created by the Copyright Act. First, fair use
facilitates worthwhile uses of copyrighted works in instances where the
value of the use is exceeded by the transaction costs of negotiating a
license.6 Under such conditions, an unfettered right to exclude might
deter such valuable uses. The potential user of the work is unlikely to
spend more to locate the owner and negotiate a license than he can
recover from the licensed use. The fair use doctrine allows the
potential user to take the needed portion of the work and make use of
it without seeking a license, thus enabling uses that would othenvise be
frustrated.
But this first type of market failure theory cannot by itself explain
or justify much of the jurisprudence of fair use. This theory would
only justify fmding fair use for unauthorized uses of relatively minor
value only when transaction costs are low; conversely, it would justify
finding more substantial unauthorized uses to be fair only when
transaction costs are exceptionally high. Yet the Supreme Court has
made clear that unauthorized use of a work may be fair even when the
copyright owner can be located easily and licensing mechanisms are
available. For example, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,' the
Court held that unauthorized adaptation of a copyrighted song for
parody by the rap music group 2 Live Crew might qualify as fair use,
even though 2 Live Crew had requested, and been refused, a license.8
Additionally, the 2 Live Crew parody was marketed for profit, which
suggests that the value of the use to the group outweighed the
transaction costs of licensing.
The 2 Live Crew case thus is emblematic of a second type of
market failure in which the value of socially beneficial uses of
copyrighted works is not fully intemalized.9 Commentary, criticism,

Constraints on the Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L REv. 354 (1999);
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy
and Copyright in Our System of Free ExpresSion, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1879 (2000). We
are not aware of anyone, however, who argues that copyright needs no First
Amendment safety valve.
6. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis ofthe Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L REv. 1600 (1982).
7. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
8. [d. at 594.
9. See Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failure
and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305 (1993).
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parody, and other unauthorized uses may be of significant value in
stimulating public debate and fostering an infonned populace, but this
value is diffuse and accrues to recipients other than the user of the
copyrighted work. 10 A certain amount of unregulated private
noncommercial sharing and copying of works also generates substantial
but diffuse value, by fueling serendipitous creation and facilitating the
free flow of ideas within society. II Where such positive externalities are
present, social welfare would be increased by use of the work, but the
potential user may be deterred from use because he will not assess it at
its full value. ill such cases, fair use may again serve to bypass
licensing that appears too costly from the perspective of the potential
user. 12 Here too the fair use doctrine has constitutional roots; the
language and history of the constitutional grant of authority to enact
federal copyright protection manifests the intent to promote the
progress of knowledge through precisely these sorts ofuses.13 Fair use
accommodates the interest in "progress" both directly, by providing the
content for such exchanges, and indirectly, by fostering an aware and
educated populace better able to participate in both public debate and the
creation of future works of authorship. Once again, other copyright
limitations an~ exceptions also perfonn these functions. 14

10. See Lochner in Cyberspace, supra note 1; Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the
Market Failure ~pproach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J.
INTELL. PROP. L 1 (1997). Alfred Yen has argued that society also may have "noneconomic" interests in such uses. See Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won't Sell: Parody,
Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 79 (1991); see also
Lochner in Cyberspace, supra note 1, at 551-59.
11. See Benkler, supra note 5; Perfect Curve, supra note 1; Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE LJ. 283 (1996).
Although few litigated cases have involved private noncommercial defendants, the
Supreme Court's decision in Sony Corp. ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984), makes clear that even widespread private noncommercial copying may
be fair. Id. at 447.
12. This problem is most acute for cases of critical review or parody that might
damage the market for the underlying work Society has a strong interest in the
commentary or the burlesque, but the owner of copyright in the criticized work is likely
to view production of such a derivative work as a direct threat to his or her (or its)
interests. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-92; Richard A Posner, When is Parody Fair
Use?,21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1992).
13. See L Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC'y U.S. 365 (2000).
14. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1998) (regarding library copying privileges); 17
U.S.C. § 100(a) (1997) (limiting exclusive distribution right to first sale of copy for
most works); 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1999) (exempting public performance and display for
nonprofit activities and organizations).
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Finally, fair use adapts copyright to new teclmologies that pose
challenges for the traditional copyright framework. IS For example,
courts have used fair use to provide "breathing room" for the reverse
engineering of copyrighted computer programs. The creation of a new
piece of software often requires examination of the structure of other
programs to design an interoperable product. Unless patented, the
utilitarian functions of computer programs lie in the public domain and
may be freely copied by those developing competing or complementary
programs. But the most efficient method of examining other software,
de compilation of the operating code, necessarily creates a copy of the
program being studied. This copying during the process of reverse
engineering might be considered an infringement of copyright.
However, courts have consistently held that making temporary or
intelUlediate copies in order to study a program and extract public
domain information is fair because it ensures the development of new
markets in copyrightable works where copyright holders might
otherwise dominate or impede such development by controlling access
to uncopyrightable technical standards. 16
In a related application, fair use catalyzes limitations on the reach
of contributory liability, thereby allowing the development of markets
ancillary to those for copyrighted works. Under U.S. law, provision of
a teclmology or' service that facilitates copyright infringement may itself
constitute infringement. But such contributory infringement occurs
only when the teclmology provided to enable direct infringement has no
substantial noninfringing use - in other words, when the device
supplied has essentially no use other than to infringe. 17 This shelter for
"dual pmpose" teclmologies prevents copyright holders from stunting
the development ofnew markets tangential to their proprietary interests.
Fair use frequently will provide the substantial noninfringinguse needed
to invoke this protection. Thus, in So,?-y v. Universal City Studios,18 the
Supreme Court held that sale of the Sony Betamax video recorder was

15. See Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other
Copyrightable Workr in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob, and Sega, 1
J. INTELL. PROP. L 49 (1993).
16. See Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602-08
(9th Cir. 2000); DSC Connnunications Corp. v. DGI Teebs., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir.
1996); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996); Sega
Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp.
v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843-44 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
17. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984).

18. Seeid.
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not contributory infringement, despite the device's capacity to facilitate
infringing recording of broadcast audiovisual works. The necessary
non-infringing use was found in the practice of "time shifting," that is,
taping a televised show at one time to be viewed at a later time, which
the court found to be a fair use. This holding cleared the path for a
flourishing market not only for home video recorders, but also for sale
and rental of the plaintiff industry's copyrighted films. 19
In sum, fair use plays an important - and constitutionally
required - role in the dissemination and production of cultural
products. As we now describe, however, fair use is currently
threatened by a combination of new distribution technologies and
unreflective legislative action.

III. CURRENT TECHNICAL AND LEGAL
~RASTRUCTURESFORRJGHTS~AGEMENT

For copyright owners, digital networks represent both a promise
and a threat. Computer networks eliminate or minimize many of the
costs associated with the publication and distribution of information
products but also substantially eliminate the costs of making and
distributing unauthorized copies. Although scholars and industry
commentators have disputed predictions that digital networks will
destroy the market for authorized copies of works, copyright owners ..
have stated a reluctance to experiment with· digital distribution without
additional technological and legal protection against unauthorized

19. Many connnentators have noted the irony of a ruling that pennitted content
users to profit handsomely by losing their infiingement claim. We suspect that if the
Court had held provision of VCRs to be contributory infringement, a market for video
recorders and video rentals still would have emerged. Under a Coasean theory of
arbitrage, assuming manageable transaction costs, if there were money to be made from
the sale of VCRs, one would expect horne electronics manufacturers to negotiate a
license from the copyright holders. Cf Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of
the Patent System, 20 J.L & ECON. 265 (1977) (advancing a ''prospecf' theory of
intellectual property rights, under which improvement rights are controlled by initial
inventors). The VCRs developed and marketed under such an arrangement, however,
most likely would have functioned rather differently than those available today. For
example, they might have been designed only to play back prerecorded videotapes, or
to incorporate built-in copy protection. Thus, the issue is not so much whether the
technology and its associated market would have developed, but what the technology
would have looked like, which is inescapably a function of who controlled (or did not
control) the development of the market Cf Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L REv. 989 (1997) (arguing that
reserving control of improvements for initial inventors is detrimental to innovation).
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copying.20 Within the past few years, they have succeeded on both
fronts. These new technological and legal protections confer a degree
of control over access to and use of copyrighted content that goes well
beyond the rights afforded by copyright law.
Together with technology experts, the copyright industries have
developed secure packaging and delivery software designed to prevent
purchasers and third parties from making unauthorized uses of digital
works. As envisioned by the copyright industries, these "rights
management systems" will be capable of controlling, monitoring, and
metering almost every conceivable use of a digital work?! This
increased control, however, will allow copyright owners to appropriate
far more protection than copyright law now provides. Of particular
significance for this paper, copyright law allows some copying of
protected expression under the fair use doctrine (and also under a
variety of other exceptions designed to serve the public interest) and

20. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications Trade & Consumer Protection of the
House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Robert W. Holleyman,
11, President & CEO, The Business Software Alliance); Copyright Legislation: Hearings
on H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm. on Cts. & Intell. Prop. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Congo (1997) (statements of Robert W. Holleyman, 11, President, The
Business Software Alliance; Allee Willis, Songwriter, on behalf of Broadcast Music, Inc.;
Tom Ryan, CEO, SciTech Software, Inc., on behalf of the Software Publishers'
Association; Gail Markels, General Counsel and Senior Vice President, Interactive
Digital Software Association; and Allan R. Adler, Vice President for Legal and
Governmental Affairs, Association of American Publishers); National Information
Infrastructure: Hearing on S. 1284 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, l04th
Congo (1996) (statentent of Kenneth R. Kay, Executive Director, Creative Incentive
Coalition); Copyright Protection on the Internet: Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the
Subcomm. on Cts. & Intell. Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, l04th Cong.
(1996) (statements of Barbara A Munder, Senior Vice President, The McGraw-Hill
Companies, Inc.; Frances W. Preston, President and CEO, Broadcast Music, Inc.; Jack
Valenti, Chainnan and CEO, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.; and the
Association of American Publishers).
21. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, Electronic Rights Management and Digital
Identifier Systems, J. ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING, March 1999, at
http://www.press.umich.eduJ jep/0403/gervais.html (last visited Oct 1, 2001); IPR
Systems, What is Rights Management: The Nature of Knowledge and Rights
Management Systems, at http://www.iprsystems.comlhtrnllrights_managementhtml
(last visited Oct 1, 2001); Mark Steftk, Shifting the Possible: How Digital Property
Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 138
(1997). For useful directories of entities currently conducting rights management
research andlor offering rights management services, see Gervais, supra; Lock-My-Doc,
Digital Rights Management (DRM), at http://www.lockmydoc.comldrmldrm.html (last
visited Oct 1,2001).
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allows any" use after the teIDl of copyright protection has expired. 22
Rights management systems, in contrast, can insist that petmission be
sought, and a fee paid, for any use. This is so, moreover, whether or
not the underlying infoIDlation is still (or was ever) protected by
copyright
The copyright industries also have succeeded in obtaining extremely
broad legal protection for rights management systems. After nearly
three years of lobbying, both in Congress and in international treaty
proceedings, the copyright industries were rewarded with Title I of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), which prohibits tampering
with or circumventing these systems and also prohibits the
manufacture, distribution, and importation of circumvention tools.23
The DMCA also authorizes the Librarian of Congress, in consultation
with the Register of Copyrights, to assess the impact of the
circumvention ban on traditional fair use practices and, if necessary, to
issue rules exempting certain users of certain categories of works from"
the ban. 24 The statute clearly states, however, that any such
exemptions will not afford a defense to the prohibition on circumvention
technologies.2S As a practical matter, therefore, any exemptions
ultimately declared will have very limited utility; self-evidently, most

22. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1998) (library copying privileges); 17 US.C.
§ I09(a) (1997) (limitation of exclusive distribution right to first sale of copy for most
works); 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1999) (public perfonnance and display exemptions for
nonprofit activities and organizations); see also 17 US.C. § 302 (1998) (establishing
duration of copyright protection).
23. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L No. 105-304, Title I, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998), codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b) (1999). The DMCA's anti-device
provisions exclude devices that have some other commercially significant purpose or
use. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(l) (1999). As a practical matter, however, enabling
uses of the underlying work that would be permitted by the fair use doctrine or some
other exception to copyright protection is unlikely to qualify as commercially
significant. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992) (directing court to consider, among other
factors, "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work''); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985);
David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA.
L. REv. 673, 712-14, 727-28 (2000). The 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty and its
requirements concerning legal protection for rights management systems are discussed
in Part V, infra.
24. 17US.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(D)(1999).
25. 17 US.C. § 1201(a)(1)(E) (1999); see also Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes,
82 F. Supp. 211, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("If Congress has meant the fair use defense
to apply to such actions [brought under the DMCA's anti-device provisions], it would
have said so.''), appeal pending sub nom. Universal City Studios v. Corley, No. 00-9185
(2d Cir.).
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users will be unable to exercise their circumvention rights unless they
are provided with the tools to do so.
The development of rights management systems powerfully
demonstrates the ability of technology to regulate behavior. Much as
physical barriers and spatial relations constrain behavior in actual space,
technical standards constrain behavior in cyberspace. In the physical
world, people cannot walk through solid walls, occupy two spaces
simultaneously, or carry skyscrapers away in their pockets.26 Similarly,
there are certain activities that simply cannot be performed on a
particular computer system because the system is not built to
accommodate the behavior - the system may be programmed to deny
access without a password, prevent logging on simultaneously from
two terminals, or prohibit alteration of a file that is designated "readonly." At first consideration, the observation that the technology will
only do what the technology will do may seem blatantly obvious, even
tautological. But as Larry Lessig and Joel Reidenberg have pointed out,
technical standards are within the control of the designer and so confer
upon the designer the power to govern behavior with· regard to that
system.27 Once constraints on behavior are built into the technical
standards governing a technology, the technical standards effectively
become a new method for governing use of that technology - in
essence, the technical standards become a type of law. Such technical
rule sets may supplement or even supplant the legal rule sets designed
to govern the same behavior. Thus, government may Ghoose to employ
or enforce technical standards to achieve goals that otherwise might be
achieved by legal rulemaking. Reidenberg in particular has examined in
detail the complex set of interactions through which governmental
action can shape technological standards into a substitute for legal
controls.28
The design of technological rule sets, however, is not the sole
provenance of the state; indeed, it is more often left to private parties.
In the case of rights management systems, copyright owners determine
the rules that are embedded into the technological controls. By
implementing technical constraints on access to and use of digital
information, a copyright ownflr can effectively supersede the rules of
intellectual property law. For example, as described above, the

26. See Lawrence Lessig, Constitution and Code, 27 CUMBERLAND L REv. 1
(1997).
27. LAWRENCE LEsSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAwS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Joel R.
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica, 76 TEX. L REv. 553 (1998).
28. See id. at 568-76.
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copyright owner may decide that the technological controls will not
pennit any copying of the controlled content, whether or not the
copying would be fair use.29 If the integrity of the controls is backed
by the state, as it is under the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions,
the legal enforcement of rights also shifts its focus from penalties for
unauthorized infringement to penalties for access unauthorized by the
rightsholder.
The implications of these developments are stark: Where
technological constraints substitute for legal constraints, control over
the design of information rights is shifted into the hands of private
parties, who mayor may not honor the public policies that animate
public access doctrines such as fair use. Rightsholders can effectively
write their own intellectual property statute in computer code.
Moreover, to the extent that the DMCA appears to legitimate
technological controls over copyrighted works, without regard to their
effect on public policy, the statute effectively grants rubber-stamp
approval to such private legislation. Yet this result - allowing every
copyright owner to custom-design its own version of copyright lawcannot conceivably have been what Congress intended.30
Of course, the promulgation of technologically embedded rule sets
is not the fIrst situation in which private allocation of rights to
infonnation has been encouraged and enforced by public institutions.
Most notably, the coercive power of the state is routinely brought to
bear in the case of contractual agreements, such as confIdentiality
agreements and intellectual property licenses. Since technical controls
can impose conditions that fonnerly might have been the subject of a
detailed license agreement, such controls might be viewed as equivalent
to a sort of licensing regime. Then, extending the analogy, penalties for
circumvention of the technological constraints simply stand in for the
private law of contract, which penalizes breach of license.
But such a comparison to contract law by no means justifIes
employment of technical controls that contravene the established public
policy of copyright Where traditional contracts are at issue, carte
blanche enforcement of private agreements has never been the rule in
Anglo-American law. When such agreements are found illegal,
unconscionable, or simply in violation of public policy, they are held
unenforceable.31 Because contract law is state law, a similar result also

29. Stefik, supra note 21, at 147.
30. Other language in the DMCA indicates as much. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1)
(1994 & Supp. V 1999).
. 31. See RESfATEMENT(20) OF CONrRACTS §§ 8, 178, 179,208 (1979).
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may be reached on grounds of federalism: Where enforcement of a
state law contract would violate the public policy inherent in the federal
intellectual property scheme, or that embedded in the Constitution itself,
such contractual provisions are preempted.32 An attempt to leverage the
federal statutory right beyond the limits set by federal policy constitutes
grounds for voiding the contract.
There is no reason to suppose that this result should differ for
technological analogues to contracts. Where rights management
systems attempt to impose restrictions on access to or use of
informational content that would be improper in a contractual
agreement, the restrictions should be viewed as equally repugnant to
public policy and equally void. One of us has previously argued that the
coercive power of the state should be extended in support of
technological constraints no farther than it may be to enforce statutory
or contractual constraints.33 Put differently, where the Constitution
imposes limits on the government's creation and recognition ofproperty
rights in intellectual goods, those limits apply equally to both legally and
technologically delineated property. In some instances of overreaching
via technological controls, the Constitution may even demand a limited
self-help right, or "right to hack," to surmount privately erected
technological barriers to information that the Constitution requires be
publiclyaccessible.34
The familiar reply from the proponents of the anti-circumvention
provisions appeals not to the language of contract but to the legitimate
right to control access to private property. There is no right, it is said,
to break into a dwelling to gain access to public domain information.3S

32. For detailed analysis of the preemption question, see Self-Help, supra note 1;
David L. Lange, The Intellectual Property Clause in Contemporary Trademark Law: An
Appreciation of Two Recent Essays and Some Thoughts About Why We Ought to Care,
59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213 (1996); Mark A Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The
Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REv. III (1999); David
Nimmer et aI., The Metamorphosis of Contract Into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REv. 17
(1999); MalIa Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the
Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of
Shakespeare Co. v. SiIstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 259 (1995); David A. Rice,
Public Goods. Private Contract. and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software
License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PI1T. L. REv. 543 (1992).
Because federal intellectual property policy is constitutional as well as statutory,
moreover, whether Congress now intends to institute a rule of deference to these new
"contracts" is irrelevant
33. Self-Help, supra note 1, at 1140-42.
34. See id. at 1140-42.
35. See. e.g., NIl Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Joint Hearing Before the
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This analogy to tangible property concludes that deployment of rights
management systems to control access to intellectual property is no
different than fencing or walling off privately held real estate. This
analogy is highly problematic even in concept; both the economics of
intangible infonnation and the scope of state-granted rights in
informational works differ markedly from the economic and legal bases
for private rights in real property.36 But even to the extent that an
analogy to real property may hold true, the argument proves too much.
The owner of private real estate cannot legitimately fence off easements
or public rights of way, or extend the fence to encompass public
thoroughfares.37
Indeed, if the real property analogy is to be followed, public rights
of access have long trumped the private right to fence. Rights
management "fencing" finds a close parallel in the nineteenth-century
enclosure ofprivate land using the newly developed fencing technology
of barbed wire. The application of this technology to open lands led to·
the infamous "range warS," in which fencing of previously accessible
parcels of privately owned range was countered by illegal fence-cutting
tactics. But it is important to note that the development of this cheap
and effective means of fencing prompted not only enclosure of
legitimately held private lands, but also illegitimate and unauthorized
enclosure ofpublic lands. The end result was the enactment of statutes
that penalized both the cutting of legitimate fences enclosing private
property and the unauthorized e~closure of public lands.38
If the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA are viewed as
responses to the threat of "fence-cutting," then one must recognize that
the analogy is more complete. The use of technology to block public
access to public domain elements of managed content and/or to block
fair uses of such content is equivalent to the unauthorized fencing of

Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Properly of the House Committee on the
Judiciary and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, l04th Congo (1995) (prepared
statement of Matybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) (analogizing copyright
management protection to keeping a document locked in an office); David Friedman,
In Defense of Private Orderings, 13 BERKELEY TECH. W. 1151 (1998); Raymond T.
Nimmer, The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. W. 827 (1998).
36. See Muddy Rules, supra note 1, at 133-35.
37. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061, 1063; Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 528 (1897);
Stoddard v. United States, 214 F. 566 (8th Cir. 1914); Hanley v. United States, 186 F.
711 (9th Cir. 1911).
38. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061, 1063; ERNEST STAPLES OSGOOD, THE DAY OF THE
CATTLEMAN 191-95 (1929); Scott S. Smith, The Wire that Won the West, AM. HERITAGE
INVENTION & TECH., FaIl 1998, at 34, 38-40.
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public lands. Unlike nineteenth-century fence-cutting laws, however,
the anti-circumvention provisions do nothing to ensure that the public
continues to enjoy the "easements" or "rights of way" that copyright
holders have no legitimate right to withdraw from public access. This
cannot be because such public rights no longer are recognized; the
current text of the DMCA gives no indication of having repealed or
annulled such public access rights. To the contrary, the statute
explicitly states that fair use and other limitations on the scope of
copyright continue to inure in digital media. 39 Yet the current language
of the statute makes no provision for such access.
The question then, as one commentator has aptly observed, is
whether the inclusion in the DMCA oflanguage reaffmning fair use is
simply an empty promise.40 There is no need for it to be. As
Reidenberg in particular has shown, Congress has at its disposal a
variety of possible tools for directing technological development into
channels that will further established public policy goalS.41 We suggest
that in the case of rights management systems, this order has been
disastrously inverted: perceived technological imperatives are improperly
driving the enactment oflegal prohibitions. The rapid development and
spread of technologies for digital copying and distribution has prompted
a rush legally to shore up technological safeguards against such
copying, without proper consideration of the policy balance that should
animate both legal and technical infrastructures. fustead, legal
protection for rights management systems should be designed with the
desired policy balance in mind. Part N considers various possible
mechanisms for achieving that result.

N. OPTIONS FOR FAIR USE INFRASTRUCTURE
Currently, the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions effectively
sanction the use of private code to write the public law of fair use· out
of existence. But the legal regime governing rights management
technologies need not be structured in such a fashion. fustead, law
could be designed to shift technological development in a direction that
balances the incentive structure of copyright protection \vith
copyright's concern for the public domain and for the legitimate fair use

39. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(I) (1997).
40. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 519,
546-47 (1999)
41. See Reidenberg, supra note 27, at 586-92.
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privileges of the public. Here, we suggest modifications to the DMCA
designed to create incentives for the preservation of fair use in digital
media.
Realizing the promise of fair use in a digital rights management
environment will require some technical mechanism to allow public
access and reuse privileges equivalent to those deemed fair in previous
media. In broad brush, there are two ways that such a system might
be designed. First, the rights management system itself might be
designed to detect and regulate fair use access.
Second, a
decisionmaker external to the rights management system might
authorize would-be fair users to override rights management controls.
We propose a fair use infrastructure that combines elements of both
approaches.

A. Codingfor Fair Use
The most direct method of accommodating fair use would be to
mandate or prompt the development of rights management systems that
directly allow purchasers of a work to make fair use of the content.
Optimally, the "breathing space" required for fair uses would be
programmed ciirectly into the technical rule set that controls access to
the work. The systems might, for example, include provisions allowing
users to extract a certain number of bits, or display the work for certain
periods of time, or partially perform the work a certain number of
times. Depending on the characteristics of the desired use, users would
be able to take these actions without having to seek additional
permission or pay additional fees.
In reality, an algorithm-based approach to fair use is unlikely to
accommodate even the shadow of fair use as formulated in current
copyright law. We are not optimistic that system designers will be able
to anticipate the range of access privileges that may be appropriate for
fair uses to be made of a particular work. Neither are we optimistic
that system designers will be able to anticipate the types of uses that
would be considered fair by a court. Fair use is irreducibly a situationspecific determination. In some instances, a user may fairly take a
work in its entirety - say, for example, where the work is entitled to
only thin protection, the use is for a protected purpose such as
scholarship, criticism, or software reverse engineering, and/or the use
is expected to have no appreciable impact on the market for the work.42

42. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Sega Enters. v. Accolade,
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Indeed, some uses, such as software reverse engineering or
automatically searching text, music, or video files for particular words,
themes, or images (a process essential for some types of academic
research), are impossible if the user cannot gain access to the entire
work.43 In other situations, where three or four of the factors weigh
heavily against a particular use, taking much less might exceed fair
use. 44
Building the range of possible uses and outcomes into computer
code would require both a bewildering degree of complexity and an
impossible level of prescience. There is currently no good algorithm
that is capable of producing such an analysis. Relatedly, fair use is a
dynamic, equitable doctrine designed to respond to changing conditions
of use. Programmed fair use functionality, in contrast, is relatively
static. At least for now, there is no feasible way to build rights
management code that approximates both the individual results of
judicial determinations and the overall dynamism of fair use
jurisprudence.
An alternative might be for copyright holders to build into rights
management systems some level of discretionary access for users that
would fall within a range that would almost always constitute fair use,
or that at least would fall within a range of use that the copyright holder
would be unwiiling to contest was fair. In the past, some attempts have
been made to set similar standards, as for example in the case of the socalled "safe harbor" provisions for educational photocopying negotiated
by educators, librarians, and the copyright industries during the 1976
revisions to the Copyright Act, or in the case of the aborted
"Conference on Fair Use" ("CONFU"), which attempted to negotiate
fair use standards for digital and multimedia works.45 Such default

977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Higgins v. Detroit Educ. Television Found., 4 F. Supp.
2d 701, 707 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
43. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1526-28; Andrew W. Appel &
Edward W. Felten, Technological Access Control Inteiferes with Noninfringing
Scholarship (Feb. 17,2000) (public comment filed with Copyright Office).
44. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564
(1985); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72-73
(2d Cir. 1999).
45. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., at 68--74 (1976) (setting forth
Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational
Institutions With Respect to Books and Periodicals), reprinted in 1976 u.S.C.C.AN.
5659, 5681-88; INFORMATION INFRASTRUCfURE TASK FORCE, INTELLEcruAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRAsrRUCfURE: THE REpORT OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON INTELLEcruAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 83-84 (1995) [hereinafter NIl
WmTE PAPER] (discussing establishment and progress of CONFU).
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parameters for fair use represent private agreements by stakeholders to
treat the designated level of usage as fair without a prior judicial
determination. Such agreed-upon standards might be built into the
access pennitted by rights management systems.
We are again skeptical, however, about the ability of negotiated
defaults to capture the full range ofsocial benefit that more flexible legal
standards allow. While these defaults sometimes might allow access
that would exceed fair use under a judicial determination, the "safe
harbor" concept is more likely to tend toward a minimalist view of fair
use. We suspect that copyright holders would be willing to concede
fair use in only a small fraction of the situations that would constitute
fair use - indeed, it was just such insistence upon minimalist guidelines
by rights holders that led to the collapse of the CONFU discussions. 46
Moreover, in the case of the 1976 "safe harbor" guidelines for
educational copying, rights holders, content users, and even courts have
shown a deplorable tendency to act as though the guidelines defined the
outer limits of fair use.47 To the contrary, such guidelines were
intended to delineate fair use minima: a floor rather than a ceiling.48 We
are consequently reluctant to recommend an infrastructure based solely
on the design of similar defaults into self-enforcing "lock-out" systems
for fear that the "ceiling" effect could be even more pernicious.
A variant on the concept of directly designed fair use "defaults"
would look to a different source for the substance of the defaults.
Judicial determinations and negotiated minimum standards are not the
only possible measures of current fair use practice; arguably, the more

46. See Final Report to the Commissioner on the Conclusion of the Conference on
Fair Use (Nov. 1998), at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/
confufconfurep.hhn (last visited Oct 1,2001).
47. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d
1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en bane), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1156 (1997); Marcus v. Rowley,
695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics CoIp., 758 F.
Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Tyco Copy Service,
Inc., Copyright L Rep. (CeIl) 1f 25,230 (D. Conn. 1981); Basic Books, Inc. v. Gnomon
Corp., Copyright L Rep. (CCH) 1f 25,145 (D. Conn. 1980); NIl WHITE PAPER, supra
note 45, at 82-83 ("Educational uses that serve the same ends and are constrained in
the same manner as the copying permitted under the Classroom Guidelines will likely
be fair . . . ."); Robert Kasunic, Fair Use and the Educator's Right to Photocopy
Copyrighted Material [or Classroom Use, 19 J.C. & U.L 271, 281, 284-85 (1993);
Albert D. Spaulding, Fair Use ofResearch and Course Packets in the Classroom, 31 AM.
Bus. U. 447,448 (1993).
48. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 68-74 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 US.C.C.AN. 5659,5681-88.
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accurate measure of fair use is the daily behavior of ordinary users.49
Rather than approximating the results of fair use jurisprudence or the
products of interest-group bargaining, rights management systems
might be designed to approximate fair use norms. For this to work,
copyright management systems would need to sanction a large amount
of unauthorized copying, but on a relatively small scale.so A precedent
for this sort of rule is the Audio Home Recording Act, which requires
that digital audio tape recordings and recording devices be designed to
accommodate serial copy management technology that allows the
production of only one generation of perfect copies.51 Another example
is section 1201(1<) of the DMCA, which requires that copy-control
technologies for videocassette recorders preserve the ability to timeshift broadcast and some cable television programming.52 We do not
mean to suggest that the scope of either statutory provision is optimal,
but simply that the provisions are illustrative of this type of
functionality.
Norm-based fair use defaults, however, are subject to many of the
same criticisms as negotiated fair llse defaults. Such defaults still
would be inflexible at the margin, and still would not encompass the full
range of uses that a court would hold fair. Thus, if norm-based
controls were regarded as implementing a fair use ceiling rather than a
fair use floor, users of digital works would enjoy far less fair use than
they have enjoyed in traditional media. Once again, we cannot
recommend a fair use infrastructure based solely on this sort of fair use
default.

49. Cj Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. U.
29, 35-37 (1994) [hereinafter Litman, Exclusive Right]; Jessica Litman, Copyright
Noncompliance (or Why We Can't "Just Say Yes" to Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. lNT'L L
& POL. 237 (1997).
50. We note that the norm regarding personal copying of music has shifted
somewhat with the advent of MP3 compression technology. Whether the law should
sanction this shift, and under what circumstances, are hotly contested questions. See
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG Recordings,
Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). In any process to specify
automatic fair use defaults, questions like this will require careful consideration.
S!. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (2001).
52. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k)(2) (2001); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that this customary practice is a fair

use).
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B. Key Access for Fair Use

The second option for the design of fair use infrastructure involves
the introduction of an external decisionmaker into the process for
obtaining access to technologically secured works. At present, only
human intelligence, reviewing the unique circumstances of a particular
use, can determine whether it is likely to be fair. Thus, we might
require users to apply for keys to access the encrypted work. This
option would allow case-by-case determination of the need for access,
building in judgment capabilities that cannot practically be emulated by
technical defaults.
One such method might be to place the fair use determination in the
rights holder's hands. We cannot, however, recommend a legal rule
that would fundamentally shift the decisionmaking authority about
whether to proceed with a use from users to owners. As we have
described above, fair use frequently condones public access in
situations where the collective public interest runs contrary to the rights
holder's individual interest. Thus, there may be a strong incentive for
the rights holder to deny access just when the public interest most
demands access. Currently, users do not need to apply to anyone to
engage in a use the user deems fair. The user simply must be willing
to pay infringement damages should her determination be erroneous.
Placing the burden of application on the user would drastically change
the dynamics of fair use and would create unacceptable social costs.53
In addition, a preauthorization system for fair use is vulnerable to
three more general obj ections. The first and second, closely related, are
that a pre authorization requirement would be costly and would chill '
spontaneous uses. Case by case determination of the fairness of the
intended use would require a lengthy and complicated approval process.

53. An example of this sort of burden-shifting is Title II of the DMCA, which
establishes a procedure for copyright owners to demand that online service providers
remove allegedly infringing material from their systems. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)
In several high·profile disputes, copyright owners have invoked this
(2001).
extrajudicial "notice and takedown" procedure against uses of copyrighted material that
lie at the core of protected First Amendment activity. See Universal City Studios, Inc.
v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), appeal pending sub nom. Universal
City Studios v. Corley, No. 00-9185 (2d Cir.); Felten v. Recording Industry Ass'n of
America, Inc., No. CV-01-2660 (GEB) (D.N.J.); Julie E. Cohen, Gall it the Digital
Millennium Censorship Act: Unfair Use, THE NEW REpUBLIC ONLINE, May 23, 2000,
at http://www.tnr.com/onlinelcohen052300.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2001) (descn'bing
Microsoft's attempt to use the notice and takedown procedure to silence critics of its
specification for implementation of the Ketberos Web security standard).
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Even a quick and inexpensive pre-screening procedure, however, will
impose some transaction costs and will deter some uses that otherwise
would have been made. As noted above, considerable social benefit
accrues from this sort of unplanned use. Research and teaching, in
particular, are processes that contain an irreducible element of ad hoc
adjustment.
The third objection is that application to a third party is likely to
compromise the sort of anonymity that users presently enjoy.
Anonymity is the current default for fair use access (and indeed for
access generally) in traditional media - a copyright holder does not
know who has made use of the work, or at what time, or in what
manner. Even if the fair use results in publication or dissemination of
a subsidiary work, the author need not reveal her name. For reasons
already discussed, we are particularly reluctant to recommend that this
situation be inverted by requiring revelation to the rights holder of a
user's identity and use for every fair use. More generally, there exists
a wide range of situations - for example, those involving parodies or
other negative critiques - in which the user may prefer to remain
anonymous. Requiring parodists and other fair users to apply to a third
party for access may chill such uses. As one of us haS outlined in detail
elsewhere, there is a strong case for a constitutional right to receive
information anonymously.54 Creation of a statutory scheme that
requires users to identify themselves would seem to run contrary to this
right and thus risks constitutional infirmity.55
To avoid the risk of private censorship by rights holders, it seems
that any ex~emally-mediated mechanism for preserving fair use in digital
works will require the participation of some third party. In some cases,
existing institutions might be conscripted into mediating access. For
example, one could envision a procedure by which, if the owner had
refused access, the needed access co~ld be judicially compelled upon
determination that the proposed use was likely to be fair. In the patent
system, declaratory judgments of non-infringement are routinely
requested of courts before a plaintiff engages in potentially infringing
activity. A legal procedure of this type would pla~e the fair use

54. See Read Anonymously, supra note l.
55. For this reason, we do not support the solution recently adopted by Australia,
which allows distribution of a circumvention device only if the recipient provides a
signed declaration that the device will be used only for permitted purposes. See
Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000, Schedule 1, § 116A(3) (Aus.)
(amending Copyright Act (1968)).
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determination back into the hands of a neutral decisionmaker, rather
than putting it at the mercy of the copyright holder.
A judicially-administered procedure, however, does not seem well
calculated to cure cost, spontaneity, or anonymity objections. Any
procedure requiring an ex ante judicial evaluation of fairness would
dramatically raise the cost of fair use and would essentially transform
the fair use right from a liability rule to a property rule. 56 Under the
current conception of fair use, the decision whether or not to use a
work is made ex ante by the user - if an infringement suit is brought
later, the court mayor may not validate the user's calculus, "but
penalties, if any, are imposed after the use has been undertaken.
Requiringpriorjudicial determination unquestionably would deter many
uses. Spontaneous uses likely would disappear altogether. Indeed,
under this system, fair use might become the sole provenance of wellcapitalized firms with the resources to engage in the process. Such
firms would do so only where the likely reward of gaining access
exceeded the cost of the procedure. We suspect that this, in turn,
would undermine one of the fair use doctrine's great strengths: its
ability to recognize and legitimize changing norms of access and use.57
Moreover, the possibility of anonymous use again would be endangered,
absent some procedural device to conceal the identity of the fair use
plaintiff during the court proceeding.
External mediation of fair use access thus requires third party
intervention at a relatively low cost, with modifications designed to
protect anonymity to the greatest extent possible. In this capacity, the
mediating party ,vill need to perform functions not currently performed
by existing institutions, and the mediating party still must command the
trust of both the owner and the user of the work. For example, Mark
Stefik and Alex Silverman have proposed the idea of a Digital Property

56. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972)
(categorizing entitlements as property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules). As
a liability rule, fair use is essentially a compulsory license at a zero royalty. See Dan L
Burk, The Trouble With Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 50 (2000).
57. C[. Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (Or Why We Can't "Just Say Yes"
to Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL 237 (1997) (arguing that the substance of
copyright law must reasonably approximate ordinary people's understanding of what is
and is not infringement); Michael Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the
Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1025 (1998) (arguing that courts hearing copyright
cases should make affirmative efforts to articulate and preserve norms of "open space"
within copyright law).
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Trust, composed of representatives from both the copyright industries
and consumer groups, that would administer fair use access. 58
A concept developed in the context of electronic commerce
supplies a more detailed model for such a third~party institution.
Innovators in electronic commerce determined early on that encryption
technology
alone could not provide the needed security and authentication for
Public key cryptography can provide
online transactions. 59
technologically unbreakable security and technologically unfalsifiable
user identification but cannot ensure that the humans who employ the
cryptographic keys to the technological systems have kept those keys
secure; rather, this technological retrofit of open networks must be
supported by institutional infrastructure. The intervention of a "trusted
third party" that associates keys with particular users is one way to
verifY the security of electronic transactions. 60
Thus far, the notion of a network of trusted third party
intennediaries for electronic commerce has not fulfilled its initial
promise. A lack of consensus on the.appropriate set oflegal rights and
responsibilities for these entities seems partly to blame. The early legal
literature on trusted third parties outlined a spectrum of legal theories
for holding them liable to their clients or to reliance parties.61
Meanwhile, early ventures attempted to avoid such liability with a set of
boilerplate disclaimers poorly designed to inspire trust62 While the

58. See Mark Stefik & Alex Silverman, The Bit and the Pendulum: Balancing the
Interests of Stakeholders in Digital Publishing, 7 AM. PROGRAMMER 1, 13-14 (1997).
59. Cryptographic applications have become important to electronic commerce
because of the essentially insecure nature of the protocols governing the Internet This
open architecture provides for wide interoperability and sharing of resources, but does
not lend itself to robust security or user authentication. See Dan L. Burk, Cyberlaw and
the Nonns of Science, 1999 B.C. INT. PROP. & TECH. F. (1999), available at
http://infoeagle.bc.edufbc_orglavp/law/st_orgliptflcommentary/contentlburk.html (last
visited Oct 1, 2001). However, with the growth of electronic commerce, the network
is increasingly used for purposes that require secure communications and user
authentication. To facilitate these new uses, cryptographic technologies and protocols
must be overlaid on the network to provide security and authentication. See Public Key
Infrastructure Symposium, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 241 (1998).
60. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in
Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. REv. 49, 52-53 (1996).
61. See id.; Jane Kaufinan Winn, Couriers Without Luggage: Negotiable
Instruments and Digital Signatures, 49 S.C. L. REv. 739 (1998) [hereinafter WinD,
Couriers]; Jane Kaufman WinD, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation ofInternet
Commerce,72 TtlL. L. REv. 1177 (1998) [hereinafter WinD, Open Systems].
62. See Froomkin, supra note 60, at 105-07 (discussing VeriSign's standard form
agreement for users); Winn, Couriers, supra note 61, at 773-79 (same); WinD, Open
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debate about liability was raging, better alternatives emerged. Other
technological innovators joined forces with existing major players in
automated transactions claiming to establish secure Internet transaction
protocols that did not directly involve users in the cumbersome
exchange and authentication ofkeys.63
In the digital rights management arena, however, we think that the
case for the development of trusted third parties is clearer, and that the
legal obstacles that have prevented the development of a trusted third
party key infrastructure for electronic commerce may be more easily
avoided. As already discussed, prospects for an adequate fair use
infrastructure that is fully automated and operates invisibly to users
seem poor. Thus far, the content industries have shown no inclination
to develop a rights management infrastructure that will ensure the
proper balance of access and security previously achieved in nondigital
media. The system we propose, however, relies on law to change the
incentives in the existing market for digital rights management systems:
Our proposal hinges upon the concept of key escrow, that is,
management of rights management keys by a trusted third party, rather
than by the owner of a work. Keys to technologically protected works
would be held by the trusted third party, who would release them to
users applying for access to make fair use. The trusted third party
would be a publicly funded institution that would be statutorily insulated
from both direct and indirect copyright infringement liability and subject
to regulatory oversight for compliance with its escrow and privacy
obligations.
Although, as we have noted, any pre authorization requirement
would impinge upon spontaneous uses and thereby threaten the overall
flexibility and adaptability of the fair use system, the trusted third
party's approval procedure could be designed to minimize this impact.
In order to avoid difficult ex ante judgments about particular uses, and
to approximate as nearly as possible the cost and incentive structure of
traditional fair uses, the third party would not be required, and would
not attempt, to make a determination about the bona fides of the access
application. Rather, the third party would simply issue keys to
applicants via a simple online procedure.
Solving the anonymity problem is far more difficult. The concept
of key escrow has been vilified in the past, with good reason, when it

Systems,supra note 61, at 124~9 (same).
63. See Jane Kaufman Winn, Clash of the Titans: Regulating the Competition
Between Established alld Emerging Payment Systems, 14 BERKELEY TECH. W. 675
(1999).
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constituted the core of a governmental plan that would have
systematically undermined the integrity of private communications.64
But a different sort of privacy interest is at stake here, where the issue
is public access to publicly distributed works of authorship, rather than
governmental access to private communications. In this instance, the
concept of third-party escrow works toward the public interest and
could be made to work in favor of preserving privacy, rather than
against both goals .
.As one alternative, a trusted third party system could be designed
for true anonymity. Under such a system, the escrow agent would
release keys to applicants without retaining or even generating
identifying records. Such a system would replicate the anonymity that
fair users enjoy in traditional media. In some cases, it might even
provide stronger anonymity - as, for example, where anonymous
access via escrowed keys might substitute for checking a work out of
the library. For exactly this reason, though, we suspect that this sort
of arrangement is likely to be politically unacceptable.
A second-best alternative would require that the agent keep records
of the applications and keys issued, but would subject the records to
stringent privacy protections similar to those that now protect many
library patron records. We think it likely that the copyright industries
would demand the ability to match keys with identities so that the
subsequent appearance ofpirated materials could be linked to particular
applicants for access. 6S However, we would re~ommend that
identifying information be released only pursuant to a court order, and
only on a showing of actual piracy, as distinct from garden-variety
infringement or arguable fair use. This places some evidentiary burden
on the copyright holder, but we note that this mechanism nonetheless
would give rights owners a substantial advantage that they do not enjoy
for works distributed in traditional media. In addition, regulations
governing the privacy practices of trusted third parties should prohibit
sale or other transfer of key access information and should require that
access and usage records be destroyed after some period of time. At
the same time, however, we would accept a requirement that the keys

64. See A. Michael Froomkin, It Came From Planet Clipper: The Battle Over
Cryptographic Key "Escrow", 1996 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 15 (1996); Hal Abelson et al., The
Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third Party Encryption (1998), at
http://www.cdtorglcrypto/risks98 (last visited Oct 1,2001).
65. Tying pirated materials to fair use applicants would require either issuing unique
keys to each applicant or using "digital watennarks" to identifY individual copies of the
work; both methods appear to be within the capabilities of current technology.
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themselves be copy-protected and would support some penalties for
unauthorized duplication ofkeys.66
We are cautiously optimistic that this combination of controlled key
access plus rigorous privacy protections could prevent the use of key
access information to intimidate critics, parodists, and the like, while
simultaneously minimizing abuse of the system for large-scale piracy.
Nonetheless, we label this arrangement "second-best" because even the
most stringent system of privacy protections for fair users is likely to
chill some lawful uses.

C. Mixed Fair Use Infrastructure
Each of the two possible mechanisms for preserving fair use in a
digital rights management environment bas advantages and drawbacks.
Automatic fair use functionality does not require human intervention but
is unlikely to afford the full spectrum offairuses allowed by law. The
use of a trusted third party intermediary to mediate access, in contrast,
potentially allows the full spectrum of uses but is less responsive to
anonymity and spontaneity concerns. The optimal result, we suggest,
is an infrastructure that combines the two.
The first hiyer of our proposed fair use infrastructure would involve
the design of rights management technologies that incorporate
automatic fair use defaults based on customary norms of personal
noncommercial use. The legal rule for facilitating this part of the
proposal would operate in a fashion similar to current provisions of the
Copyright Act designed to encourage copyright registration and deposit,
by conditioning copyright enforcement for United States works on
implementation of the automatic fair use defaults. 67 To guard against a
"race to the bottom" in fair use law, the law would clearly state that the
level of copying permitted by the automatic defaults does not define the
full extent of permitted fair use.
Those who desire greater fair use access, meanwhile, would turn
to the trusted third party intermediary. Under the system, deposit of

66. We would not, however, support penalties for the manufacture or distribution
of technologies capable of copying keys. Cj 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(l) (1999);
supra text accompanying notes 25-41.
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 41l(a) (1999); see also infra Part V (discussing treaty
compliance issues). A ''United States work" is a work fust published in the United
States, fust published simultaneously in the United States and a foreign nation, or fust
publisbed in a foreign nation that is not a treaty party if all of the authors are nationals
or domiciliaries of the United States or legal entities beadquartered within the United
States. See 17U.S.C.A. § 101 (2001).
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access keys into key escrow would be facilitated by conditioning anticircumvention protection for both United States and non-United States
works on such deposit. 68 Users who failed to obtain access via the
escrow agent would be subject to suit for circumventing technical
measures. Those users, however, still might escape liability by
successful invocation of a statutory or constitutional defense to
circumvention liability. Rights holders that opt not to deposit keys ,vith
the escrow agent would be unable to invoke legal protection against
circumvention. For such unescrowed works, a "right to hack" would
effectively substitute for access via the escrowed keys. As noted in
Part ill, the DMCA's ban on the manufacture and distribution of
circumvention technologies also would need to be modified to make this
defense a realistic possibility.69 Finally, to preserve the relative
anonymity of the key escrow system, the records of applicants and
keys issued would need to be guarded by stringent legal protections
along the lines described above.
The most likely and appropriate escrow agent would be a publicly
funded institution, such as the Library of Congress. As indicated
above, we see little prospect for development of private escrow agents.
Content owners are unlikely to pay voluntarily for 'an institution that
facilitates low cost or free access to their works?O Fair users are
almost by defuiition poor candidates to fund an escrow institution. In
any case, the point of fair use is to provide low cost or free access to
content; assessing fair use fees to fund escrow agents would run
counter to this purpose. Even were content owners to fund a private
key escrow institution, however, we think that a publicly funded
institution would be the preferred choice because the public policies
underlying fair use require some guarantees ofpublic accountability and
institutional longevity.
The Library of Congress's long e.xperience with copyright matters
and with the deposit and archival preservation of copyrighted works

68. See 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1999); 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1994); see also infra Part V
(discussing treaty compliance issues).
69. For this and other reasons, although the Copyright Office might be charged with
establishing the escrow facility, it could not effectively do so on its own authority
within the current statutory framework established by the DMCA. In addition, we think
that establishing a comprehensive system of key escrow for fair use probably would be
inconsistent with the DMCA's more limited grant of authority to the Copyright Office
to declare certain exemptions to the ban on circumvention of rights management
protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (1999).
70. It is worth nothing, however, that the data processing industry has made efforts
to "self regulate" in the face of threatened privacy legislation.
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makes it the ideal candidate to fill the escrow role. 71 In our view,
moreover, the deposit requirement that currently applies to published or
registered works would require copyright owners to provide the Library
of Congress with the unrestricted ability to read, view, or listen to the
work and to subject the work to any digital storage and search tools
that the Library might develop or acquire.72 Our proposal offers a
means of administering fair use access to these deposited works.
Finally, the tradition of strong privacy protection by libraries, including
the Library of Congress, makes such an institution best suited to
maintaining the privacy of fair users. 73 Funding for the fair use
infrastructure could be provided either through general taxation, by a
small administrative fee levied on copyright owners, or by some
combination of the two.
Additionally, the system would need to include an exemption for
trade secret works. 74 Special care must be taken, however, lest this
exemption swallow the rules mandating fair use access. As in the'
world of copyrighted works distributed before the advent of technical
protection, we anticipate that for the' majority of creative works poems, plays, novels, films, sound recordings - no credible question
of trade secrecy should ever arise. A work should not be deemed to
contain trade secrets simply because the copyright owner has elected
to shroud it with technological protection. No work held out to the
general public, or to anyone belonging to a particular subset (e.g.,
materials scienti~ts, interior' decorators, Fortune 500 corporate
librarians, or individuals making more than $100,000 a year) should be
eligible for a trade secrecy exemption. More particularly, computer

71. The archival preservation of digital works raises complex problems concerning
the degradation of storage media and the obsolescence of storage, retrieval, and display
formats. See The Internet Archive: Building an 'Internet Library' Storage and
Preservation of the Collections (2001), at http://www.archive.org/aboutlstorage.htrnl
(last visited OCl I, 2001); Brewster Kahle et aI., Public Access to Digital Materials
(2001), at http://www.archive.org/newslcolloquial200lIPublicAccess0309.doc (last
visited Oct 1,2001). Designating the Library of Congress as the key escrow custodian
likely would improve the ubrary's ability to study these issues and to optimize its
preservation capabilities.
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 407 (1999); 17 U.S.C. § 408(b) (1994).
73. See Library of Congress Regulation 1917-3, § 5(B)(13) (1997); Read
Anonymously, supra note 1, at 1031 & n.2l3.
74. Other federal statutes requiring agencies to disclose information contain similar
e.'{emptions. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1994) (exempting trade secrets from the
Freedom of Information Act); 10 C.F.R § 207.4 (providing that trade secrets conveyed
under ESECA are e.'{empted from public disclosure); 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.20(a), 20.6l(c)
(exempting trade secrets conveyed to FDA from public disclosure).
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software marketed to the general public or to a specific subset (e.g.,
small businesses or graphic designers) also should not be eligible for a
"trade secret" designation because a rule exempting software from the
system would negate fair use jurisprudence allowing decompilation of
software to discover its unprotected functional elements.7s We note,
finally, that in the case of computer programs, keys provided for fair
use access will need to have the ability to override technological
restraints on decompilation. 76
Finally, we note that there may be some concern under this system
regarding the access of foreign nationals to keys, allowing offshore
competitors to bypass technical protections on American products.
Given that we have proposed an exemption for legitimate trade secrets,
we believe that there should be little concern about this scenario. First,
under our proposal, as under the law of copyright prior to the DMCA,
foreign nationals would be at perfect liberty to travel to the United
States to acquire and make fair use of copyrighted works, including the
reverse engineering of software. With regard to offshore activity,
requisitioning of keys would be largely immaterial for those nations that
lack anti-circumvention laws; they could otherwise simply obtain the
work and legally hack around its technical protections. Moreover, in
countries that have their own anti-circumvention prohibitions, use ofthe
keys would still be constrained by the requirement to conform with
local copyright law.
The presence of other national laws regarding anti-circumvention
highlights the fact that the balance between access and protection must
be struck in a global milieu, where the U.S. approach to technical
protection is not insular and where our suggestion may find broader
application than the American DMCA. Although we have focused on
the implementation of a fair use infrastructure within U.S. copyright
law, the escrow principles we have outlined here also might find
application under the European Union's ("E.U.") new copyright

75. The DMCA's current exception to the circumvention and device bans for
software reverse engineering pennits only a subset of the conduct that would be
considered fair use under copyright law. See infra text accompanying notes 106-07.
76. We do not, however, advocate direct release of source code to would-be reverse
engineers. As Pamela Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer explain, requiring competitors
to do the work of reverse engineering preserves important first-mover incentives. See
Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, WI YALE L.I. (forthcoming 2002); see also Pamela Samuelson et aI., A
Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
2308 (1994) (arguing that software innovation requires a limited amount of artificial
lead time to avoid market failure).
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directive, which in some respects reflects greater cognizance of the
user access problem than does its American counterpart?7 Like the
DMCA, the E. U. Copyright Directive requires member states to provide
legal protection for rights management systems.78 Unlike its U.S.
analogue, however, the E.u. Copyright Directive allows member states
to enact legislation requiring that copyright holders provide users with
the means to take advantage of exceptions or limitations to the exclusive
rights granted under copyright law.79 These limitations and exceptions,
which are enumerated in the directive, specifically include private
reproduction, criticism and parody, and news reporting. so To prevent
user rights from being nullified by technical controls, moreover, the
directive creates an incentive for content owners to design technical
measures capable of facilitating permitted uses; member states may
legislate to compel the provision of means for access only if content
owners have not already provided such means vo1untarily.sl The key

77. Directive 2ooIl29IEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the
information society, 2001 OJ. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter E.U. Copyright Directive].
78. See id. arts. 6(1)-(2). Although the directive employs some language that is
reminiscent of the DMCA, it adheres more closely than the DMCA to the language of
the WIPO Copyright Treaty, discussed infra text accompanying notes 84-86. Like the
treaty, the E.U Copyright Directive merely requires member states to provide
"adequate legal protection" against acts of knowing circumvention and against the
manufacture and. distribution of circumvention devices. E.U. Copyright Directive, supra
note 77, arts. 6(1)-(2). It lacks the convoluted and contradictOlY DMCA language
distinguishing access and use controls, as well as the DMCA's lengthy list of complex
exceptions.
79. See E.U Copyright Directive, supra note 77, art 6(4).
80. See id. art 5.
81. We note that the E.U. Copyright Directive contains a troubling provision that
recognizes "agreements between rightsholders and other parties" as one of the
''voluntary measures" that content owners can adopt in order to provide users with the
means of benefitting from an exception or limitation. E.U. Copyright Directive, supra
note 77, art 6(4). Under one reading, this provision might permit content owners to
require users to waive their rights to the benefit of exceptions or limitations as a
condition of access. Given the recent history in the United States of mass market
licenses that purport to abrogate fair use and other user privileges, this European
prmision might seem an invitation to the proliferation of similar "sbrinkwrap" or
"clickwrap" license provisions. See generally Mark A. Lemley, InteIlectual Property
and Shrinlrnrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L REv. 1239 (1995); Madison, supra note 57; J.H.
Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated InteIlectual Property Rights:
Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 47 U. PA. L
REv. 875 (1999). We suggest, however, that such provisions would not give consumers
the intended benefits of copyright exemptions and limitations that the directive
requires, and that use of boilerplate waivers instead should trigger the enactment of a
key escrow requirement or a similar legislatively mandated means of fair use access.
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escrow system that we propose here might be an appropriate means by
which member states could ensure user access, or promote voluntary
provision of access by copyright owners.
It is worth noting that the E.U. Copyright Directive contemplates
nothing so broad, flexible, or indeterminate as the U.S. concept of fair
use. Rather, in the European tradition of "fair dealing," the directive
lists specific circumstances under which member states may allow a
user to make unauthorized use of a copyrighted work. 82 The exceptions
and limitations enumerated in the directive are discrete and relatively
narrow. Design of a rights management infrastructure that would allow
users access commensurate with such exceptions may be less
challenging than design of an infrastructure to accommodate U.S.-style
fair use. Nonetheless, we expect that it would still be difficult to design
an algorithm that could take into account whether, for example, a
reproduction is "for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor
indirectly commercial," as the directive requires. 83 Thus, the key
escrow option discussed here may remain an attractive method of
providing user access.
Our proposal will not exactly reproduce the conditions of fair use
in traditional media. Although code is malleable, digital media work
differently than traditional media in too many ways. Nonetheless, we
think that a niixed fair use infrastructure based on both automatic
default and key escrow elements would go a long way toward
approximating traditional fair use conditions. We note, as well, that
development of a mixed infrastructure for digital fair use might lead to
recognition of "new" fair uses never needed for works in nondigital
media - for example, a right to access a work for certain purposes
after expiration of a time-limited subscription agreement. Thus, our
proposal would enable the continued evolution of fair use practices and
noons. We turn now to considerap.on of whether the proposal is
feasible as a matter of intemationallaw and desirable as a matter of
policy.

v . TREATY CONSTRAINTS
A critical consideration in evaluating the feasibility of the system
proposed here is whether legally-induced, automatic fair use defaults
and legally induced escrow of rights management keys would comport

82. See E.U. Copyright Directive, supra note 77, art. 5.
83. ld. art. (5)(2)(b).
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with the obligations imposed on the United States by international
copyright treaties. Here, we consider the proposal's compatibility with
the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") Copyright
Treaty, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works ("Berne Convention"), and the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs"). We conclude that
the proposal passes muster under all these agreements.
As an initial matter it might seem that our proposal would be most
likely to run afoul of the provisions of the WIPO Copyright Treaty.
After all, the passage of the current DMCA was purported to' be
necessary to bring United States copyright law into line with its
obligations under that treaty.84 As Pamela Samuelson has explained,
however, prior to the enactment of the DMCA, United States copyright
law already satisfied the treaty's requirement of "adequate legal
protection and effective legal remedies" against circumvention of
technological measures. 85 Even amended as we propose, the DMCA's
anti-circumvention measures still would go well beyond what the treaty
requires. Moreover, the "Agreed Statements" accompanying the treaty
include a declaration that signatory countries may continue to recognize
existing limitations and exceptions to copyright, including fair use, as
appropriate in the digital environment and also may create new
exceptions and limitations as appropriate. 86 This intepretative provision
eA-pressly contemplates the continued viability of fair use under the
treaty. Our proposal simply would implement the contemplated fair use

84. As of this writing, the WIPO Copyright Treaty has not entered into force. We
expect that it will do so soon, however, since the promulgation of the E.U. Copyright
Directive clears the way for ratification and adoption of implementing legislation by the
E.U. member countries. See World Intellectual Property Organization: Copyright
Treaty, December 20, 1996, art. 2l(iii), 36 I.LM 65 [hereinafter WIPO Copyright
Treaty] (providing that the treaty will bind the European Community upon deposit of
an instrument of ratification by the Community).
85. See id. art. 11; Samuelson, supra note 40, at 530--32. Protections already
established within U.S. law included the doctrines of contributory infringement and
vicarious liability, as well as additional, special-purpose protections against circumvention, such as the rule proluoiting descrambJing of satellite transmissions, 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1994 & Supp. V 1999), and the serial copy management requirements of the Audio
Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994). Both of the latter provisions are far
less restrictive of user conduct than the combination of rights management systems and
legal protection under the DMCA
86. See Agreed Statement Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996,
available at http://www.wipo.orgfengfdiplconfldistno/96dc.htrn (last visited Oct 1,
2001).
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norm - and would do so in a way that largely preserves the ample anticircumvention protections that Congress created.
We turn next to consideration of the key escrow proposal in light
of the older Berne Convention, which the WIPO treaty was intended to
update. Under Article 5(2) of Berne, "[t]he enjoyment and the exercise
of [copyright] shall not be subject to any formality."87 We consider it
unlikely that the fair use infrastructure proposed here would run afoul
of this requirement. To understand why, it is important to distinguish
conditions on copyright protection from conditions on anticircumvention protection and to consider the two halves of our
proposal separately.
With respect to our proposal for a first tier of fair use guarantees
embodied in programrried defaults, we believe that a rule conditioning
copyright enforcement for United States works on the adoption of such
defaults clearly comports with the requirements of Berne. The proposal
is patterned on section 411 of the current Copyright Act, which
provides that the copyright in a work of United States origin cannot be
enforced in court until the work 4as been registered.8s Subjecting
United States works to more stringent standards than those applied to
foreign works does not violate treaty obligations. Moreover, we think
that copyright owners of foreign works would have some incentive to
comply with these standards because doing so would reduce the
number of users seeking to obtain fair use keys under the key escrow
system.
The key escrow system we propose here, in contrast to our
programmed default proposal, would set conditions only on anticircumvention protection. This provision is patterned after two other
provisions of the U.S. Copyright Act. Under section 412, if a work of
any nationality is not registered promptly after creation, the copyright
owner forfeits any future right to statutory damages or attorneys'
fees. s9 Under section 405, although notice is no longer a requirement
for copyright protection, failure to place a copyright notice on a work
may allow defendants to raise an "innocent infringer" defense to

87. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24,
1971, art. 5(2), S. TREATY DoC. No. 99-27 (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 273 [hereinafter
Berne Convention].
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1999) (requiring registration of copyright as a
prerequisite for an infringement action for United States works).
89. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1994) (prohibiting awards of statutOI)' damages or
attorneys' fees for infiingement occurring after publication but before registration,
unless registration is made within three months after first publication).
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monetary liability in an enforcement action. 9O Like these provisions, our
proposal affects remedies rather than rights; unlike them, it does not
even affect infringement remedies. The deposit requirement is not
addressed to the work, nor to the copyright in the work, but only to the
rights management system protecting a work. Deposit would be
required only for the copyright holder to enjoy statutory anticircumvention protection. Even absent a deposit, the copyright holder
still would be fully protected by copyright law against unauthorized
copying if the work's rights management system is circumvented.
Copyright owners wiII enjoy all the rights required under the Berne
Convention whether or not they choose to take advantage of the
opportunity for special statutory anti-circumvention protection.
With regard to anti-circumvention protection proper, the WIPO
Copyright Treaty provides in Article 3 that the treaty "shall apply
mutatis mutandis the provisions of Articles 2 to 6 of the Berne
Convention in respect of the protection provided for in the Treaty."91"
This article could be read to apply the Berne Convention's noformalities provision to the requirement for "adequate legal protection"
of technical measures. But, as we have noted previously, the United
States already offered such protection prior to the passage of the
DMCA. The modifications we suggest here affect only the statutory
protection offered by the DMCA, and not the doctrine of contributory
infringement or the other preexisting protections, all of which would
continue to be cognizable Without deposit or other formality.
Consequently, we view this portion of our proposal as a legitimate and
entirely defensible effort to balance two sets of obligations that must
both be honored: the United States' obligations under the Berne
Convention and the constitutional policies underlying fair use.
In addition to the matter of formalities, we must consider whether
our proposal for programmed fair use defaults plus key escrow
comports with the United States' substantive obligations under the
Berne Convention and its related obligations under TRIPS.92 This
analysis is complicated by the incorporation of the Berne Convention
within TRIPs; to analyze TRIPs, one must both consider the Berne

90. See 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1999) (exempting from infringement liability innocent
infringers who prove reliance on lack of notice).
91. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 84, art. 3.
92. See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex Ie,
33I.LM. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
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Convention requirements within TRIPs and the separate requirements
of TRIPs proper.93
The Berne Convention subjects exceptions to the copyright owner's
exclusive right of reproduction to a three-part test: exceptions may
apply "in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author."94 The
TRIPs agreement incorporates this requirement and extends it to cover
limitations or exceptions to any of the exclusive rights of a copyright
owner.9S Several scholars have noted the potential for incompatibility
between this language and the American doctrine of fair use. 96 To be
sure, both the Berne Convention and TRIPs proper contain a number of
exceptions and limitations, for news reporting, research, and other
activities, that may well cover many applications of fair use. However,
the fair use doctrine potentially applies more broadly to many other
unauthorized uses that are not enumerated in the treaties and could well
be perceived as conflicting with both normal exploitation of a work and
with the author's legitimate interests.
A dispute resolution panel of the World Trade Organization, which
administers the TRIPs Agreement, recently ruled that a different
exception provided in the U.S. Copyright Act violated the TRIPs threepart test. The panel ruled that section 110(5), a recently enacted
provision that permits certain small business owners to play radio and
television broadcasts without remitting an (additional) royalty to the
copyright owner, conflicted with normal exploitation of the works and
prejudiced the legitimate interests of the rights holders. 97 Observers

93. See id. part II, § 1, art. 9(1).
94. Berne Convention, supra note 87, art. 9(2).
95.. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 92, art. 13.
96. See, e.g., Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact ofthe WIPO Copyright
Treaty on TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L 441 (1997); Ruth Okediji,
Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 75 (2000);
Marshall Leaffer, The Uncertain Future of Fair Use in a Global Information
Marketplace, 62 Orno ST. LJ. 849 (2001). Other U.S. limitations and exceptions to
copyright owners' rights pose similar problems. See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Paying
the Piper, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L 231 (1999) (discnssing the blanket exception
allowing small business owners to play radio programming added to § 110(5) of the
Copyright Act in 1998 by the Fairness in Music Licensing Act); Laurence R. Helfer,
World Music on a U.S. Stage: A BernelTRIPS and Economic Analysis of the Fairness
in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L REv. 93 (2000) (same).
97. Report of the Panel, United States - Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,
WTIDS1601R (June 15, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct 1,
2001).
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have speculated that the fair use doctrine would not survive a similar
challenge.98
Fair use, however, is different than section 110(5) in two important
ways. First, the fair use doctrine expressly incorporates many of the
same concerns as the BemefTRIPs three-part test A court applying the
doctrine must consider "the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work," and cases applying the doctrine
to new copying and distribution technologies make clear that this
consideration is not an empty one.99 Arguably, the fair use doctrine
simply provides the means by which the United States applies "the
BemeffRlPs three-part test to exceptions allowed under its own law.
Second, fair use is different than section 11 0(5) precisely because it has
such a wide range of application. Assuming that specific applications
of fair use might be perceived to violate the BemeffRlPs three-part test,
the doctrine taken as a whole could not possibly do so - indeed, as
noted above, the doctrine taken as a whole enables many uses that the
BemeffRlPs framework expressly pennits. 100
Other language in TRIPs lends support to this conclusion. In
particular, as Professor Okediji reminds us, Article 7 states that
protection of intellectual property should be designed to "the mutual
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a
manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of
rights and obligations."IOI As we have described above, fair use is
designed to accommodate precisely such a social balance, and our ".
proposal is designed to preserve that balance.

98. See Okediji, supra note 96; Leaffer, supra note 96; see also Tyler G. Newby,
What's Fair Here is Not Fair Everywhere: Does the American Fair Use Doctrine Violate
International Copyright Law?, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1633, 1648-50 (1999).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); see. e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2001); Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381
(6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1156 (1997); Am. Geophysical Union
v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994); Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, 56
u.S.P.Q.2d 1862 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
100. In this context, it is noteworthy that the wro Panel did not disturb the older
''homesty1e'' provisions of section 110(5) that permit small business owners to play
broadcasts "on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes."
17 U.S.C. § 11 0(5)(a) (1999); see also Report of the Panel, United States - Sections
301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WfIDSI52IR (Dec. 22, 1999), available at
http://www.wto.org (last visited Nov. 1,2001) ("Conformity can be ensured in different
ways in different legal systems. It is the end result that counts, not the manner in which
it is achieved. Only by understanding and respecting the specificities of each member's
legal system, can a correct evaluation of conformity be established. '').
. 101. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 92, art 7; see Okediji, supra note 96.

HeinOnline -- 15 Harv. J. L. Tech 75 2001-2002

76

Harvard Journal ofLaw & Technology

[Vol. 15

In addition, Article 40 specifically acknowledges that "some
licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property
rights ... restrain competition" and "may have adverse effects on trade
and may impede the transfer and dissemination of technology."102
Article 40(2) authorizes member states to enact legislation regulating
"licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute
an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on
competition in the relevant market." 103 Specific examples ofcompetitive
restraints that states may individually address include "conditions
preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licensing."I04
In the context of digital rights management, we must consider as
an initial matter whether the language of Article 40 may be applied to
technological restraints on access to or use of intellectual property. We
think that it may. As we have noted above, by instantiating tenns that
otherwise might be conveyed by written licenses, technological controls
will in many instances constitute the equivalent of such licenses and
thus also constitute a "licensing practice or condition" that is covered
by the TRIPs language. Even if .the controls are not themselves
considered to be the equivalent of licenses, they frequently will be
accompanied by written licenses and so again would constitute a
"licensing practice or condition."
Article 40 appears primarily directed toward particularized
regulation ofunfair competition, including anticompetitive practices that
in the United States are considered matters for antitrust law. Within the
U.S. copyright system, however, fair use plays an essential role in
mediating between proprietary rights and unfair competition
concerns. lOS To take just one example, as discussed above, courts have
recognized fair use as a legal vehicle to ensure access to copyrighted
computer programs for purposes of reverse engineering to create
interoperable or competing products. l06 Although the DMCA includes
a provision allowing circumvention of rights management systems for
reverse engineering purposes, the provision is quite narrow and does
not cover the range of reverse engineering activities that would be
legitimate under current judicial formulations offair use. 107 Additionally,

102. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 92, art 40(1).
103. Id. art. 40(2).
104. Id.
105. See Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 1.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (1999); Julie E. Cohen, WIPO Treaty Implementation
in the United States: Will Fair Use Survive?, 21 EUR. INTEIL. PROP. REv. 236, 239
(1999).
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software sbrinkwrap licenses now routinely include provisions that
purport to require surrender of a purchaser's fair use reverse
engineering rights as a condition of access to the program. These
technological and contractual restrictions surely constitute a condition
"impeding transfer and dissemination of technology." The system
proposed here is permissibly directed toward remedying this problem.
Finally, regardless of its fit with specific provisions of the Berne
Convention and TRIPs, fair use might be viewed under principles of
international law as an area of reserved sovereignty under the treaty.
Under general principles ofpublic international law, nations may, under
certain circumstances, reserve to themselves sovereign authority over
some treaty-related matters. lOS Neither the Berne Convention nor TRIPs
was considered by Congress to be self-executing, and the application
of each to the United States was limited to that in the implementing
legislation for each treaty.l09 In neither case has the United States'
implementing legislation altered fair use - nor, to the extent that fair"
use is a constitutional priilciple, could it do so. Thus, the implementing
legislation could be viewed as an attempt to reserve matters relating to
fair use to the sovereign control of the United States.
This view of fair use as an area of reserved sovereignty is
complicated by Berne Convention provisions stating that ratification of
or accession to the Convention constitutes acceptance of all of its
requirements unless the ratifying country expressly declares its
reservations at the time of accession. lIo The United States did not
expressly declare any reservations when it deposited its instrument of
ratification, and arguably the Berne Convention would not permit
derogation from the three-part test. 111 Yet clearly the United States did
not accept all of the Berne Convention requirements upon accession,
and this position has been largely accepted by other signatory nations.
Here again we agree with Professor Okediji that the silence of other
signatories should be deemed to indicate their acquiescence under
intemationa1law. 1I2 The international community was well aware of

108. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; Okediji, supra note 96, at 144-48 (discussing rules
governing reservation of sovereignty and their application in the context of international copyright law).
109. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L No. 103-465, 108 Stat 4809
(1994); Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L No. 100-568, 102 Stat 2853
(1988).
1 10. See Berne Convention, supra note 87, art 30.
111. See Okediji, supra note 96, at 146.
112. See id. at 121, 147-48.
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American fair use and of the U.S. approach to the Berne Convention.
After more than a decade of U.S. reliance upon their acquiescence,
other signatories to the treaties cannot now complain about a doctrine
that they were willing to overlook.
With regard to anti-circumvention protection proper, TRIPs
imposes no requirement of anti-circumvention protection at all. The
anti-circumvention provisions of the WIPO Copyright Treaty were
drafted three years after TRIPs was opened for signature. By its own
terms, the WIPO Copyright Treaty "shall not have any connection .vith
treaties other than the Berne Convention, nor shall it prejudice any rights
and obligations under any other treaty.,,1\3 Thus, TRIPs is at worst
silent on the question of circumvention and arguably amenable to the
policy and practices that the proposal would further.
We conclude that a statute such as we propose, accommodating
fair use, should lie within the permissible range oflegislation under the
BerneffRIPs framework. The proposed fair use infrastructure does not
violate any treaty obligations concerning the protection of copyrighted
works, and it arguably advances other treaty goals. . Thus, neither
technology nor law stands as an obstacle to implementation of the
proposed fair use infrastructure. We turn, finally, to consideration of
whether other factors might do so.

V1.

COUNTERARGUMENTS

(OR, THE RISKS OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING)
Here, we step back and consider whether our proposal for a mixed
rights management infrastructure is wise. We have argued that
legislative action can alter the direction of technological change. This
proposal may make things better - think, for example, of federal
regulations mandating first seatbelts and later airbags in passenger
cars _.- but it can also make them worse. For example, ·the
congressionally mandated adoption of "wiretap ready" telephone
switching equipment has led to weakened protection for many
important attributes of private communications. 1I4 The DMCA itself is
a sobering example of an ill-conceived legislative decision to favor one
technological trajectory over others. Legislative changes also may

113. In fact, it appears that the WIPO Copyright Treaty will not automatica1Iy bind
all signatories to the Berne Convention, but only those nations that actually ratify the
new treaty. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 84, art. 21.
114. See Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After the
Digital Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L REv. 949 (1996); see also 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994).
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trigger undesirable technological responses that Congress did not intend
or foresee. Larry Lessig, for example, has persuasively argued that the
development of anti-pornography filterware that permits targeted
censorship is a technological development far worse than the cyberzoning legislation it was designed to forestall. lls Might our proposal
have a similar effect? Are our proposed changes more like airbags, or
more like "censorware"? Is our insistence on the possibility of
productive congressional action naive? As Jessica Litman reminds us,
copyright-related legislation has repeatedly proved itself especially
vulnerable to capture by special interests. 1I6 Might a different sort of
legal response to copyright management systems be better?
Our proposal for a mixed fair use infrastructure is inferior to
traditional fair use rights in two respects. First, it would not foster the
full degree of spontaneity enjoyed by fair users' in non-digital media.
Even a well-designed set of automatic defaults will not permit every use
that a court might deem fair. Even a streamlined futernet-based
procedure for obtaining keys will inhibit spontaneity and will impose
transaction costs that users of non-digital media need not incur.1I7
Realistically, too, there will be server outages and other technical
difficulties that prevent fair users from obtaining keys.
Second, and more important, the proposal in its second-best
incarnation protects privacy, not anonymity. Traditional fair users have
enjoyed both. There is no central (or distributed) database containing
their names and contact information. We suspect that many who rely
on fair use to produce and distribute their own information goods academic works of critical commentary, software created through
reverse engineering, and the like - do not desire anonymity in the long
run. Yet anonymity is an indispensable facilitator for other, less
"official" types of criticism and other types of exploration. Many social
critics and dissenters function outside the ivory tower and cannot
invoke norms of intellectual inquiry to deflect the scorn directed at them
by their communities. IIS Furthermore, arguing that anonymity is the

115. See Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 629
(1998).
116. See Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L
REv. 19 (1996); Litman, Exclusive Right, supra note 49; Jessica Litman, Copyright
Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L REv. 275 (1989).
117. As one supporter of rights management bas argued, however, users of nondigital
works incur other sorts of transaction costs. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use:
Tlze Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76
N.C. L REv. 557 (1998).
118. See Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: Tlze Tension
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special province of "pirates" rather than legitimate fair users seems akin
to arguing that wiretaps do not threaten innocents who have nothing to
hide. In our view, both arguments are equally specious. Thus, we
think that for our "second-best" system to be tenable, the privacy
protections for fair users who access escrowed keys must be
extraordinarily robust. Indeed, we wish to stress that this paper should
not be construed as support for any version of our proposal that
incorporates weaker privacy protection. I 19
In sum, the proposal is a second-best solution designed to make the
best of a bad situation. Rights management systems threaten to destroy
fair use of digital materials, and to eliminate spontaneity and anonymity
for would-be fair users and for readers generally. Our proposal accepts
that these systems will be implemented and strives to minimize their ill
effects on socially-valued uses. This characterization, however, raises
the question whether we, too, are taking rights management systems as
a given and thereby foreclosing a better solution to the problem of
preserving fair use in the digital environment.
What might another solution look like? First, the Copyright Office
might use its rulemaking authority under the DMCA to establish a set of
exemptions to the ban on circumvention of rights management
technologies that preserves the traditional spectrum of fair uses. 120
Based on the results of the first such rulemaking proceeding, we think
this result unlikely.121 Instead, the Copyright Office has interpreted the

Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L REv. 1, 59-71
(1991).
119. Adoption of the proposal also should not foreclose other measures to preserve
anonymity. As we have noted, a key escrow system for fair use beyond that allowed by
the programmed defaults would not preclude individuals who elect to hack copyright
management systems from raising constitutional defenses to a lawsuit or prosecution
under the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions. In addition, it is worth repeating
that anonymity and privacy are concerns not only of fair users, but also of users
generally. See Read Anonymously, supra note 1. Fashioning anonymity and privacy
protections for readers in the era of digital rights management is a subject beyond the
scope of this paper. That said, Congress could and should direct that copyright
management systems be designed, insofar as possible, to honor anonymous payment
systems.
120. See Exemption to Prolul>ition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 64 Fed. Reg. 66,139 (proposed Nov. -24,
1999); U.S. Copyright Office, Rulemaldng on Exemptions from Prohibition on
Circumvention of Technological Measures that Control Access to Copyrighted Works,
available at http://www.loc.gov/copyrightlI20Ilanticirc.htrul (last visited Oct 2, 2001)_
121. See Exemption to Prolul>ition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,564-66 (2000)
(codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201.40) (establishing exemptions for literary works whose
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scope of the DMCA's grant of rulemaking authority as narrowly as
possible. III But even if the Copyright Office were to declare meaningful
exemptions to the ban on circumvention, the separate statutory ban on
the manufacture and distribution of circumvention technologies would
render the exemptions meaningless and would necessitate a court
challenge to the statute itself.l23
Next, following such a challenge, a court might declare the
DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions unconstitutional in their present
form. Afterward, individuals seeking to make fair use of protected
works would enjoy a right to hack the protective technologies without
fear of civil suit or criminal prosecution. As a result, protectiondefeating technologies would become more readily available and simpler
to use. Our proposal expressly provides for this result, of course, but
it is likely that the availability of the programmed-default and keyescrow alternatives for fair use would decrease the incentives to mount
such a challenge. 124
We note, first, that the DMCA's early airings in the federal district
courts do not inspire faith in these predictions. l2S Assuming, however,
that the courts of appeal show more backbone, we think that under a
fair use regime defined by constitutional litigation, individuals seeking
access to encrypted or otherwise protected digital works still will enjoy
materially less fair use, and less spontaneity and anonymity in fair use,
than they do now. Although a court might (and, in our view, ~hould)
declare the anti-circumvention provisions facially invalid, a far likelier
result is that decisions as to constitutionality would be made on a

access control mechanisms have malfunctioned or become obsolete and for lists of
websites blocked by digital censorware).
122. See id. at 64,559-60.
123. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(I)(E) (1999) (stating that exemptions to ban on act
of circumvention shall not serve as defenses to other provisions); id. § 1201(a)(2), (b)
(1999) (proluoiting the manufacture, diStribution, or importation of circumvention
technologies).
124. The legal regime we propose also might be more likely to survive constitutional
challenge, since it would be considerably less restrictive than the current regime.
125. See Microsystems Software, Inc. v. Scandinavia Online AB, 98 F. Supp. 2d 74
(D. Mass. 2000); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), appeal pending sub nom. Universal City Studios v. Corley, No. 009185 (2d Cir.). It is posSlole that Felten v. Recording Industry Ass'n of Am, Inc., No.
CV-01-2660 (GEB) (D.NJ.), will prove a better vehicle for constitutional cballenges to
the DMCA. Felten and his co-plaintiffs, researchers in computer science at Princeton
University, seek declaratory and injunctive relief prolubiting enforcement of the
DMCA's anti-device provisions to prevent them from discussing and publishing their
research findings on the efficacy of certain anti-circumvention technologies.
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piecemeal, as-applied basis. 126 Thus, the threat of prosecution or suit
under the DMCA will continue to chill many lawful fair use activities.
Even facial invalidation ofanti-circumvention legislation, moreover, will
not prevent private publishers from implementing rights management
systems.
Congress might do so, of course, but we think it
inconceivable that Congress would pass such a law. Even the most
user-friendly circumvention technologies will require some threshold
level of technological competence.
There remains, finally, the question whether successful court
challenges to the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions might create
incentives for content owners to design their systems more flexibly, to
accommodate a degree of spontaneous, anonymous fair use. For
example, the prospect of costly litigation of repeated constitutional
challenges might provide incentive to implement steganography
(watennarkingtechnology) that could allow the proliferation ofa certain
digital work to be traced back to particular distribution points or copies,
or even to particular users. 127 Conceivably, this might move copyright
holders toward steganography alone as a method of deterring digital
piracy.
We think, though, that a system of mandatory programmed fair use
minima plus key escrow probably would create even stronger incentives
for more flexible design. Most obviously, our proposal would require
a minimum degree of system flexibility as a condition of state-backed
copyright enforcement. Although private ordering has become
increasingly central to copyright enforcement strategies, the copyright
industries continue to view a degree of state-backed enforcement as
essential. 128 Particularly when compared with the uncertainties of
constitutional litigation, we think that our proposal is more likely to
encourage the development of a "lex informatica" that serves all of the

126. Cf. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 332-39 (rejecting defendants' as-applied
challenge to the DMCA's ban on circumvention devices and refusing even to consider
their facial overbreadth challenge).
127. See NIl WHITE PAPER, supra note 45, at 188-89; KemJeth W. Dam. Self-Help
in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1999); Rosemarie F. Jones, Wet
Footprints? Digital Watermarks: A Trail to the Copyright Infringer on the Internet, 26
PEPP.L REv. 559, 569 (1999).
128. Imposing the "carrots" of mandatory fair use minima and key escrow might of
course diminish the preference for state enforcement. Cj. Tom W. Bell, Escape from
Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works
(working paper Mar. 29, 2000) (on file with authors) (arguing that copyright law should
enable authors to opt out of the statutory scheme of protection). However, our faith
in the ingenuity of backers is such that we do not think a system of pure private
ordering would be in the copyright industries' best interests.
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interests underlying the copyright system, including the public interest
in fair use.
In addition, we cannot unqualifiedly endorse steganography as the
magic solution to the problem of fair use under digital rights
management. Although a system of steganography-based rights
management could support spontaneous fair use of digital materials
more fully than would a proliferation of "lock-out" systems and fair use
preauthorization requirements, a system that attempted to register
unique copies to identified users would destroy anonymity for fair
users, and indeed for all readers. Although we think that steganography
offers certain advantages over other forms of rights management and that a steganography-based system need not be designed to
compromise anonymity (or privacy) - we think that the legitimacy of
such a system would depend on the specific details· of its
implementation.
Returning, finally, to the example of filterware, it seems highly
likely that the market would have developed filterware whether or not
Congress had passed legislation zoning Internet pornography. We
cannot say the same for our proposal, and we think this is one of its
strengths. Where copyright management systems are concerned, the
market drives· inexorably toward ever-less-flexible controls - or,
rather, for controls that are flexibly responsive to the business plans of
rights-holders, not the desires and habitual practices of fair users. A
move toward greater flexibility will require some other impetus. We
think that our proposal could provide this impetus. At the least, we
hope that it will encourage greater discussion of the possibilities.
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